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Hungary’s New Constitution and Its New Law on 
Freedom of Religion and Churches: The Return of the 
Sovereign 
Renáta Uitz* 
On January 1, 2012, Hungarians witnessed the passage of their new 
Constitution, called the Fundamental Law of Hungary.1 It added 
important transitional provisions on church status2 and a new cardinal 
law3 on freedom of conscience and religion, the legal status of churches, 
religious congregations, and religious communities.4 The new 
Constitution introduced changes in tone as well as in substance in the 
legal regime applicable to freedom of religion and church-state relations. 
The lasting impact of this cannot be fully appreciated yet; nonetheless, 
the first measures indicate clear departures from European and 
international human rights standards. 
Compared to these elated phrases, the provisions on freedom of 
religion sound sobering. The new Constitution in its chapter entitled 
“Freedom and Responsibility” guarantees the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion as an individual right (Article VII(1)),5 
 
 * Professor of Law; Head of Department at Central European University, Legal Studies, 
Budapest. I am grateful to W. Cole Durham, Jr. for extensive comments on an advanced draft, to the 
participants of the “Oxford Journal of Law and Religion Seminars,” held in April 2012 in Balliol 
College (Oxford) and to panelists at the “Registration, Religious Autonomy and Freedom of 
Religion or Belief” conference held in Jun 2012 at Central European University for further 
discussion and insight. All translations from Hungarian are mine unless otherwise noted. All 
websites were visited for the last time on September 17, 2012. 
 1. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
HUNGARY], Jan. 1, 2012 (Hung.). [hereinafter THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY]. The English 
translation is available at http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/c3/30000/ 
THE%20FUNDAMENTAL%20LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf. Unless otherwise noted, I am 
relying on this translation. 
 2. The Transitional Provisions were adopted on December 30, 2011. THE FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW OF HUNGARY, art. 21(1).  
 3. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, art. T(4): “Cardinal Acts shall be Acts of 
Parliament, the adoption and amendment of which requires a two-thirds majority of the votes of 
Members of Parliament present.”  
 4. Act No. 206 of 2011 on freedom of conscience and religion, and the legal status of 
churches, religious congregations, and religious communities. 
 5. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, art. VII(1): “Every person shall have the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include the freedom to choose or 
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prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion (Article XV(2)), and also 
provides for the continued separation of church and state (Article 
VII(2)). In addition, the new Constitution makes the regulation of 
church-state relations subject to a statute passed with a qualified majority 
(a so-called ‘cardinal law’) (Article VII(3)). 
The new Constitution was first tested in the summer of 2011, when 
the first cardinal law was passed to entrench its provisions on freedom of 
religion and church-state relations.6 This new cardinal law was meant to 
replace the 1990 law on churches7 under which 100 persons could 
request the registration of a church from a court of law, showing a 
charter of operations with a self-governing organizational structure, and a 
declaration that the founders intended to pursue a religious activity 
(Article 8(1) and Article 9).  Under the new law, all of the nearly 300 
previously registered churches (with the exception of fourteen listed in 
the Appendix) would have had to seek re-registration under more 
demanding conditions, which most of them would not meet. The original 
bill was introduced in the summer of 2011; however, it never went into 
effect, as parliament abruptly withdrew it in December 2011. Soon 
afterwards, a replacement bill was tabled in parliament. It was first read 
on December 23, 2011, and it was passed on December 30, 2011. At the 
same time, parliament also adopted so-called Transitional Provisions to 
the new Constitution. The Transitional Provisions contain additional 
rules on church-state relations, expressly authorizing parliament to 
recognize churches and determine the conditions for church status 
(Article 21(1)). The new rules were published in the Official Journal on 
December 31, 2011, and entered into force on January 1, 2012. 
 
The latest cardinal law of December 2011 essentially reinstates 
largely the same registration procedure and criteria which were 
introduced in the summer of 2011. Parliament remains in charge of 
registering churches through an altered popular initiative (népi 
 
change religion or any other persuasion, and the freedom for every person to proclaim, refrain from 
proclaiming, profess or teach his or her religion or any other persuasion by performing religious acts, 
ceremonies or in any other way, whether individually or jointly with others, in the public domain or 
in his or her private life.”  
 6. Act No. 100 of 2011 on freedom of conscience and religion, and the legal status of 
churches, religious congregations and religious communities. 
 7. Under Act No. 4 of 1990. For an English translation of the 1990 Hungarian law in W. 
COLE DURHAM, JR. & SILVIO FERRARI, LAWS ON RELIGION AND THE STATE IN POST-COMMUNIST 
EUROPE 153 et seq. (2004). For a comprehensive English language account on the law see BALÁZS 
SCHANDA, RELIGION AND LAW IN HUNGARY (2011). 
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kezdeményezés) procedure. Parliament may recognize a church upon the 
request of 1,000 petitioners (Article 14(3)) and twenty years of presence 
in Hungary or 100 years of operations internationally (Article 14(2)(c)). 
With the exception of the fourteen recognized churches listed in the 
cardinal law’s appendix, all previously registered churches are 
transformed into a so-called religious association (Article 43(1)), and 
have to seek re-registration under the new law if they intend to preserve 
their church status. 
In February 2012, parliament assessed the status of over eighty 
previously recognized churches. In doing so, parliament followed the 
ordinary procedure for statutory amendments, and not the church 
recognition procedure prescribed in the cardinal law. On February 27, 
2012, parliament adopted an amendment to the cardinal law on churches, 
adding another eighteen communities to the list of “recognized 
churches.”8 On the same day, parliament in a resolution refused to 
recognize the church status of some sixty-six previously registered 
churches without providing any reasons for the refusal.9 Some of the 
eighteen newly-recognized churches clearly do not meet the statutory 
criteria for church status, while some churches which were turned down 
clearly satisfy statutory conditions. It was argued in parliament that when 
amending the cardinal law to the effect of recognizing further churches 
parliament took discretionary decisions alongside political criteria, and it 
purposefully did not follow the process for church recognition in the new 
cardinal law. Furthermore, it was confirmed in the parliamentary debate 
that the conditions for church recognition in the new cardinal law do not 
grant church status as a matter of a right, so parliament retains its 
discretion in granting church status even if an applicant clearly meets 
statutory criteria. 
Irregularities in the first round of parliamentary recognition of 
churches aside, the new cardinal law introduces a church recognition 
regime which is much harsher than its predecessor, and indeed is much 
more demanding than most of the registration regimes currently in force 
in the OSCE region.10 In authorizing the State to distinguish between 
churches based upon their “actual social role” (Article 9(2)), the new 
 
 8. Act No. 7 of 2012 amending the act on freedom of conscience and religion, and the legal 
status of churches, religious congregations and religious communities. 
 9. 8/2012 (II. 29.) OGY Resolution on the refusal of church registration. 
 10. For a comparative summary of existing regulatory frameworks, see W. Cole Durham, Jr., 
Legal Status of Religious Organizations: A Comparative Overview, 8(2) REVIEW OF FAITH & 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3-14 (2010). 
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Hungarian cardinal law on churches distributes previously-registered 
churches in three categories. The top tier is reserved for recognized 
churches with a notable social role, the middle tier is for other 
recognized churches, and the bottom level is for religious associations. 
The new Constitution and its Transitional Provisions, as well as the 
cardinal laws, were passed by a parliament in which a Christian-
Conservative governing coalition has two-thirds (i.e., constitution-
making) majority. These instruments were introduced somewhat 
unexpectedly: constitution-making was not a campaign promise of the 
governing coalition, while the idea of a new law on churches surfaced 
rather unexpectedly, at a time when constitution-making was already in 
full swing in parliament. The withdrawal of the cardinal law, which was 
passed earlier in the summer, and its reintroduction with an 
accompanying adjustment to constitutional rules in December 2011 was 
also a surprise. The hasty recognition of additional churches in February 
2012 was an admittedly political decision where the rights of the affected 
churches had to yield to political considerations. 
This Article will first introduce constitutional changes in light of 
their broader context (Part I), will then provide some insight into the 
origins of the new law (Part II), and finally will reflect on the key 
provisions of the new law on religion and churches in light of European 
standards of human rights protection, as developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights (Part III). This Article argues that the provisions 
of the new Constitution, together with the new law on churches, appear 
to solidify the status quo of church-state relations, signified by the state’s 
cooperation with preferred churches with proper “actual social status,” 
while also formalizing long-held reservations about “small churches.” 
Although the new constitutional framework appears to facilitate the new 
statutory arrangement, this Article will demonstrate that the key 
provisions of the new Hungarian law on freedom of religion and 
churches violates human rights commitments under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The conclusions of this Article resonate 
the concerns expressed in the opinion of the Venice Commission on the 
new Hungarian law in March, 2012.11 
I.  THE NEW HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION: REINFORCING HISTORICAL 
 
 11. Opinion 664/2012, CDL-AD(2012)004 (hereinafter: Venice Commission on Hungary), 
available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2012/CDL-AD(2012)004-e.pdf. The Commission’s 
website also offers an English language translation of the Hungarian law via 
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_Opinion_ef.asp?L=E&OID=664. 
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IDEALS 
On its face, the new Hungarian Constitution (Fundamental Law)—
which entered into force on January 1, 2012—appears to bring little 
change to the existing church-state regime. Its operative articles protect 
free exercise of religion (Article VII(1)), prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of religion (Article XV(2)), and call for the “separate functioning” 
of church and state (Article VII(2)). There are two significant, 
fundamental differences in comparison to the previous 1989 
Constitution.12 The new provision on separation of church and state 
proclaims that the “state shall cooperate with the churches for 
community goals.” (Article VII(2)). As the cooperation requirement was 
absent from the 1989 Constitution, the new provision suggests a shorter 
distance between church and state than envisioned in the early days of 
transition to democracy.13 As another notable distinction, while the 1989 
Constitution required freedom of religion to be regulated by a qualified 
majority (Article 60(4)),14 the new Constitution requires a qualified 
majority (i.e., cardinal law) for the regulation of church-state relations 
(Article VII(3)) but not for imposing limitations on individual religious 
liberty. Thus, in light of these two subtle departures from the previous 
constitutional framework one may sense that the new Hungarian 
Constitution intended to fundamentally readjust church-state relations. 
 
The Hungarian parliament added Transitional Provisions to the 
articles of the new Constitution on December 30, 2011. A dedicated 
provision makes it the task of parliament to pronounce “recognized 
churches” and to determine the conditions for church status dependent on 
the length of church operations, membership, historical traditions and 
social support (Article 21(1)). This rule is clearly not transitional in 
nature: instead of assisting in the entry into force of the new 
constitutional provisions on freedom of religion and church state 
relations, it clearly empowers parliament to recognize churches one by 
 
 12. Act No. 31 of 1989 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, as available in 
English translation of the website of the Constitutional Court at 
http://mkab.hu/index.php?id=constitution. 
 13. The corresponding provision of the 1989 Constitution, Article 60(3), reads as follows: “In 
the Republic of Hungary the church and the State shall operate separately.” A MAGYAR 
KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY], Oct. 23, 1989 
(Hung.). 
 14. Id. art. 60(4) (a “majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament present 
shall be required to pass the statute on the freedom of conscience and religion”). 
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one, a power which was not mentioned in Article VII of the new 
Constitution. Therefore, the constitutional status of the Transitional 
Provisions is at least problematic. Nonetheless, it is clear that the re-
adopted church law which was also passed on December 30, 2011, seeks 
to comply with the Transitional Provisions, since it authorizes parliament 
to take a discretionary decision on the recognition of previously 
registered churches in individual cases (Article 14(3)). 
Furthermore, under the new Constitution the era of formal legal 
equality of recognized churches appears to be over. In the new regime, 
the prominence of certain preferred churches over others is apparent, a 
development which is not completely out of line with the spirit of 
constitutional jurisprudence under the 1989 Constitution.15 The new 
cardinal law’s authorization for different treatment of select churches on 
the basis of their actual social role (Article 9(2)) creates a three-tier 
system that privileges certain recognized churches over others, while 
newly created religious associations remain at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. This solution furthers inequality between previously registered 
churches in a political climate where time and again new religious 
movements and minority faiths came under suspicion and political 
attacks. 
A.  A Brief Account on Religious Toleration in Hungary Before the 
2011 Act 
Forces of toleration have always competed with legally-reinforced 
preferential treatment in Hungary. Despite Hungary’s multi-confessional 
make up ever since the Reformation, the Roman Catholic Church has 
always held a prominent position. Starting with a conversion to 
Catholicism by its monarch at the turn of the previous millennium, the 
country had been ruled by the Catholic Habsburg monarchs16 since 1526 
until the end of WWI. Since the early days of the Reformation, periods 
of toleration were followed by intense counter-Reformation or re-
Catholicization. 
For instance, in the Seventeenth Century, the Peace Treaty of 
 
 15. See Gábor Attila Tóth, Unequal Protection: Historical Churches and Roma People in the 
Hungarian Constitutional Jurisprudence, 51(2) ACTA IURIDICA 122 (2010); see also Renata Uitz, 
Aiming for State Neutrality in Matters of Religion, The Hungarian Record, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 761 (2006).  
 16. On the role of Catholicism in Habsburg state ideology, see Marie-Elizabeth Ducreux, 
Emperors, Kingdoms, Territories: Multiple Versions of the Pietas Austriaca?  97(2) CATH. HIST. 
REV. 276 (2011). 
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Vienna—as a side note— brought religious toleration for Calvinists and 
Lutherans (Protestants)17 in Hungary while preserving the primacy of 
Roman Catholicism under Act No. 1 of 1608 on Religion.18 The precepts 
of toleration applied not only to the high estates but also to the villages 
and peasants; public and military offices in Hungarian affairs were 
opened for Hungarians, irrespective of their religious denomination. The 
legal reinforcement of toleration for the so-called “accepted religions”—
with the primacy of Roman Catholicism intact—came in a detailed 
regulatory scheme adopted by parliament in a series of statutes in 1647.19 
The Toleration Act of 1647 confirmed the rights established in the 1608 
Act and provided undisturbed access to church bells and cemeteries.20 
The prohibition of coercion in matters of conscience was reaffirmed in a 
separate article.21 Another act of parliament settled the return of seized 
Protestant church property in admirable detail.22 
Despite all these favorable developments towards toleration, the end 
of the seventeenth century brought a period of aggressive counter-
Reformation in Hungary following the uncovering of an aristocratic 
conspiracy against the Habsburg court (the so-called Wesselényi 
conspiracy of 1666-1670). Although there were several prominent 
Roman Catholics among the still surviving participants, the measures 
affecting Hungary included not only a show trial of the conspirators, but 
also brought another trial of thirty-three Protestant preachers and 
schoolmasters in 1673 in Bratislava. This was followed by another trial 
of 700 Protestant preachers and schoolmasters.23 The ones who refused 
to convert to Catholicism were sold as galley slaves. They were finally 
saved from their plight due to the support of a Europe-wide Protestant 
support network, and their ransom was paid by the Dutch Admiral 
 
 17. In contemporary statutes, Calvinists are referred to as “Helvets,” while Lutherans are 
mentioned as “Augsburgians.” Contemporary Hungarian terminology mentions Calvinists as 
“Reformed” Protestants, while Lutherans are “Evangelicals.” My text keeps with Lutheran and 
Calvinist to the extent practicable, while Protestant refers exclusively to “old / traditional European” 
Reformation denominations. 
 18. For a discussion of parallel contemporary developments in Europe, see MALCOLM 
EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 49 et seq. (2008). 
 19. Acts No. 5–15 of 1647. 
 20. Act No. 5 of 1647, art. V. 
 21. Act No. 5 of 1647, art. VI. 
 22. The fact that the property restoration clause needed to be reinforced two years afterwards, 
in Act Nos. 10 and 12 of 1649, suggests that the restoration did not go without opposition. 
 23. The records of the 1674 trial are translated and edited in KATALIN S VARGA, VITETNEK 
ÍTÉLŐSZÉKRE . . . AZ 1674-ES GÁLYARAPBER JEGYZŐKŐNYVE [Being taken before judgment… The 
records of the 1674 galley slave trial] (2000) (in Latin and in Hungarian).  
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Michiel de Ruyter. 
It was not until the late nineteenth century that a more or less 
comprehensive scheme of religious toleration was established in 
Hungary under Act no. 53 of 1895, which—with some adjustments—
lasted until 1990. In the 1895 regime, a three-tier church registration 
system distinguished between accepted (bevett) and recognized 
(elismert) churches, whilst at the bottom of the hierarchy were those 
faiths which did not belong to either class which were simply “tolerated” 
(i.e., not persecuted). For its time it was a considerable achievement that 
the 1895 Act allowed for the state recognition of further religious 
communities, even if in a lesser class, and established legal rules for their 
recognition. This three-tier system was described as an intermediate 
solution between retaining an established church and separating churches 
from the state.24 
Importantly, until 1918 the Hungarian monarch retained profound 
control functions over all religious communities functioning in Hungary, 
including the Roman Catholic Church. Despite its contested origins, 
according to tradition, the Hungarian monarchs since the beginning of 
statehood were to be regarded as “apostolic.”25  By the seventeenth 
century it was common wisdom that the apostolic Hungarian king retains 
powers equivalent to those of the first king, Saint István (Saint Stephen), 
the recipient of the crown. In time, Saint Stephen’s crown became 
enlarged beyond its physical boundaries in the doctrine of the Holy 
Crown.26 The apostolic quality (which is usually granted to kings 
responsible for historic conversions of their subjects, but not to entire 
dynasties), coupled with the doctrine of the Holy Crown, permitted the 
Hungarian monarchs to retain significant influence over the Catholic 
Church. Historically, royal powers over the Catholic Church (the so-
called főkegyúri jog) expanded to creating the internal divisions of the 
church (seats of bishops and archbishops), appointments of church 
leaders as well as to lesser positions, the distribution of church property, 
and the power to assent to the communication of church letters and 
circulars to the general public.27 When other religions were recognized 
 
 24. BÉLA SZATHMÁRY, FEJEZETEK AZ ÁLLAMI VALLÁS- ÉS EGYHÁZJOGBÓL, TANULMÁNYI 
SEGÉDLET AZ V. ÉVFOLYAMOS JOGHALLGATÓK SZÁMÁRA 36 (2006) (chapters from state religion and 
church law, study aid for 5th year law students). 
 25. Margit Balogh, Regnum et sacerdotium, Állam és egyház történetileg változó viszonyai 
Magyarországon (Regnum et sacerdotium, The historically changing relations of church and state in 
Hungary), 6(4) VALLÁSTUDOMÁNYI SZEMLE 9, 11-15 (2010). 
 26. Id. at 12, n.5. 
 27. The Catholic congregation of Transylvania was exempted from these royal powers. Id. at 
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by the Hungarian government over the centuries, an equivalent of similar 
powers (the so-called főfelügyeleti jog) was extended to the newly 
recognized religious communities until the end of World War I. It is this 
Holy Crown that is expressly referred to in the new Constitution’s 
National Avowal as the physical embodiment of the continuity of 
Hungarian statehood: “We honour the achievements of our historical 
constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the 
constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of the 
nation.”28 
The difference between “accepted” and “recognized” churches was 
only abolished after World War II, with Act No. 33 of 1947. As far as it 
applied to recognition of churches, however, the 1895 law remained in 
force in Communist Hungary under the supervision of the State Office of 
Church Affairs,29 and some churches continued to function even under 
the state-mandated philosophy of atheism.30 In the 1980s—before 
transition to democracy began—the Communist government recognized 
as a proper church the Hungarian Evangelical Brotherhood, the 
Congregation of Faith, the New Hungarian Apostolic Church, the 
Hungarian Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Hungarian 
Community of Krishna Consciousness under the 1947 Act.31 
At the time of transition to democracy, a new law (Act No. 4 of 
1990) on religious freedom and churches was prepared by the outgoing 
Communist parliament in consultations with the existing churches.32  
The 1990 law opened up the same church status for communities of at 
least 100 believers, a charter of operations with a self-governing 
organizational structure, and a declaration that the founders intend to 
pursue a religious activity on an equal footing (Article 8(1) and Article 
9). As a result, during the last twenty years over 300 religious 
communities (among them representatives of world religions, new 
religious movements and home-grown congregations) had operated 
 
16. 
 28. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, National Avowal. 
 29. The office was disbanded with the arrival of democracy. It is not a major surprise that the 
1990 Act on Freedom of Religion expressly prohibits the creation of any agency or office the sole 
purpose of which is the monitoring or management of church affairs (Article 16(1)). 
 30. Péter Paczolay, The Role of Religion in Reconstructing Politics in Hungary, 4 CARDOZO 
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261, 264–65 (1996). 
 31. Here I follow Balázs Schanda, in 3 A MAGYAR ALKOTMÁNY KOMMENTÁRJA 2244 n.1 
(András Jakab ed., 2009) (Commentary to the Hungarian Constitution). 
 32. Id. at 2245. 
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undisturbed under the law.33 Registration used to be granted as a matter 
of formal compliance with the language of the 1990 law, with no further 
in-depth inquiry. Although the 1990 law did not distinguish between 
“historic” or “proper churches” and “sects,” the distinction clearly 
existed in the vocabulary of the constituency affected by the 1990 law. 
As an eminent Hungarian expert on church-state relations remarked on 
the reception of the registration regime of the 1990 Act, “many 
representatives of the traditional churches felt offended at having been 
put into the same category as ‘sects.’”34 
B.  The Words of the National Avowal Under Scrutiny 
The fact that the new Constitution opens with the phrase “God bless 
the Hungarians” will strike few Hungarians as religious in tone: this is 
the opening line of the National Anthem which survived several regime 
changes and in general is not associated with a religious spirit. Prominent 
in setting the tone of the new Constitution is the opening section, the so-
called National Avowal which proclaims that “[w]e are proud that our 
king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground and made 
our country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago;” “We 
recognise the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood. We value the 
various religious traditions of our country;” “We promise to preserve the 
intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart in the storms of 
the last century;” and that “We honour the achievements of our historical 
constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the 
constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of the 
nation.”35 As vague and symbolic as the above passages may appear, 
these phrases are meant to influence the application of the provisions of 
the new Constitution in practice. 
In a key sentence, the National Avowal praises “the role of 
Christianity in preserving nationhood. We value the various religious 
traditions of our country.”36 Despite the reference to religious diversity, 
this language may be read easily as if it provided primacy to the one 
 
 33. For the latest data in English, see US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2010 – HUNGARY, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148942.htm. As it was also reflected in the parliamentary 
debate, there is no firm data on the number of registered (and still operating) churches. 
 34. Balázs Schanda, Religion and State in the Candidate Countries to the European Union: 
Issues Concerning Religion and State in Hungary, 64(3) SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 333, 342 (2003). 
 35. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, National Avowal. 
 36. Id. 
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strain of Christianity which was instrumental in preserving nationhood 
(i.e., Roman Catholicism). With this gesture, the new Constitution and 
the new cardinal law on freedom of religion and churches are shown not 
to be based on the protection of religious liberty, but rather they reflect 
the well-known, pre-Enlightenment pattern wherein the scope of 
religious toleration reflects the state-of-power struggles of competing 
political elites. This approach is antithetical to the protection of religious 
liberty as a fundamental right. 
Against the background of historical developments in Hungary, the 
reference to the Holy Crown in the National Avowal is equally 
problematic. After all, as was mentioned above, it was the historical 
doctrine of the Holy Crown which permitted the monarch to select 
between religious communities worthy of recognition, as well as to 
interfere with the internal affairs of churches which were selected. A 
constitutional or regulatory regime based on benevolent gestures of a 
sovereign is clearly in contravention of the protection of religious liberty 
as a human right. 
If the language of the National Avowal is vague, there is even less 
guidance on what one shall regard as “an achievement of the historic 
constitution” of Hungary as understood in Article R(3) of the new 
Constitution. For instance, the regulation of religious toleration and 
church-state affairs in Hungary certainly has an extensive history, and 
the selection of achievements from this record is a clearly value-driven 
exercise. One may point to periods of increased toleration as much as to 
periods of re-Catholicization as an example of an achievement, 
depending on one’s personal preferences. The extent to which a strong 
constitutional attachment to a particular strain of Christianity will in 
practice allow for the recognition of pluralism and tolerance in a neutral 
fashion under the new Constitution is not clear. 
As even such a brief overview suggests, in Hungary the development 
of the legal framework on church-state relations was gradual. Historic 
developments (such as the 1608 Toleration Act or the 1895 Act) stand as 
clear testament of the increasingly undeniable richness and plurality of 
the Hungarian religious scene. At the same time, it is not an exaggeration 
to say that before the entry into force of the first democratic Constitution 
in 1989 and the 1990 Law on Churches, the Hungarian legal system did 
not recognize full legal equality of religious communities and preserved 
a prominent position for the Catholic Church throughout much of 
Hungarian history. Recognition for other religious communities 
depended on the whims of the political process, was highly dependent on 
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the religious affiliation or personal philosophy of key decision-makers, 
and, at least historically, included major backlashes. Therefore, the new 
Constitution’s determination to privilege the strain of Christianity which 
was instrumental in preserving Hungarian nationhood is highly suspect 
from the perspective of the protection of religious freedom and equality. 
II.  THE NEW HUNGARIAN LAW ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND 
CHURCHES ENTERS THE SCENE 
The new Hungarian law on freedom of religion and churches came 
into existence in several stages. The new conditions for church 
registration under the 2011 law are much harsher than under its 
predecessor. The mandatory waiting period of twenty years, together 
with the requirement of 1,000 petitioners to request recognition, makes 
the law the second-most demanding in Europe (right after Slovakia), 
while parliamentary recognition of churches is unique for a law of its 
kind. While under the 1990 law, more than 300 churches were registered, 
the new law initially recognized only fourteen churches in its Appendix, 
to which another eighteen were added in the first round of church 
registration in February 2012. At the same time, the application of sixty-
six previously registered churches was rejected by parliament.37 As these 
are undoubtedly profound changes, the debates on the various bills in 
parliament themselves are worthy of closer attention as they provide 
insight into legislative intent, an essential factor for the assessment of the 
law in light of European human rights standards in the last section of this 
Article. 
A. The Road to a New Hungarian Law on Freedom of Religion and 
Churches 
The cardinal law on freedom of religion and churches was among the 
very first laws adopted under the new Constitution. The reason for the 
rush is not entirely easy to trace, as the 1990 Law on Churches has not 
been a matter of major public concern in the recent past.38 Nonetheless, 
by the Autumn of 2010—around the same time when the making of the 
new Constitution was starting to accelerate—the fight against “business 
 
 37. 8/2012 (II. 29.) OGY resolution. 
 38. See, e.g., Balázs Schanda, Stabilitás és bizonytalanság a magyar állami egyházjogban, 
Húsz évvel az 1990. évi IV. törvény után [Stability and uncertainty in Hungarian church regulation, 
Twenty years after Act no 4 of 1990], 65(1) JOGTUDOMÁNYI KÖZLÖNY 3 (2010) (arguing that it is 
not necessary to adopt a new law).  
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sects” became a prominent topic in the Hungarian media space. In the 
middle of November 2010 the conservative television channel HírTV ran 
a report on “Judas cents” (Júdásfillérek) in search of hundreds of 
millions of forints of government funding channeled to business sects. In 
December 2010, the secretary of state for the Ministry of National 
Resources, Imre Nyitrai, told the press that the budget could save three 
billion forints, if church status were made less accessible.39 In early 
2011—i.e., before the new Constitution was passed and ratified—László 
Szászfalvi, the secretary of state in the Ministry of Public Administration 
and Justice, promised a new church law, indicating that the optimal 
threshold for registration would be at 10,000 founding members. 
The basic vision of the new law arrived in the spring of 2011.40 
According to Secretary Szászfalvi, the aim of the new law is “to 
reinforce communities which engage in credible church and religious 
activities and to remove from the scope of the law those organizations 
which were formed expressly for business purposes.”41 In a refined 
version, Secretary Szászfalvi announced in early April 2011 that under 
the new law the Catholic, the Reformed, the Lutheran and the 
Evangelical churches, as well as the Unitarian and the Orthodox 
communities would be recognized as historic churches. In addition, he 
clarified that “[h]istoric churches will be expected to have a nation-wide 
institutional network of public service, for which they will continue to 
receive public funding.”42 In closing, he observed that the new law 
would finally bring some order, and that it would be successful in 
significantly reducing the number of registered churches. According to 
the government, a new law had also become necessary because the 1990 
law became outdated by international standards.43 
Following an eventful spring filled with skirmishes, the church bill 
 
 39. Magyar Rádió, Szigorodik az egyházalapítás  (Church registration to be tightened) (Dec. 
2, 2010), available at http://www.mr1-kossuth.hu/hirek/szigoritjak-az-egyhazalapitas-
szabalyait.html. 
 40. Új korszak kezdődik az egyházaknál (The beginning of a new era for churches), official 
portal of the Hungarian Government, KORMÁNYPORTÁL (Mar. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.kormany.hu/hu/emberi-eroforrasok-miniszteriuma/egyhazi-nemzetisegi-es-civil-
ugyekert-felelos-allamtitkarsag/hirek/uj-korszak-kezdodik-az-egyhazaknal. 
 41. The details of the first concept differed significantly from the provisions of the law which 
was finally adopted and will not be discussed here in detail. 
 42. Száz éves mőködés után járna a történelmi egyház megnevezés (Historic church label is 
due after 100 years of opeartion), MTI / ORIGO (Mar. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110317-szaszfalvi-laszlo-legalabb-100-eves-multtal-kell-
rendelkezniuk-a-tortenelmi.html. 
 43. Id. 
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finally emerged in June 2011, after alleged widespread societal 
consultations and some name-calling directed mostly at the Congregation 
of Faith, a widely popular new religious movement. For church status, 
the bill required twenty years of operation and 1,000 founding 
members.44 In the registration process, courts were to be assisted by a 
body of experts.45 The Appendix to the bill included the names of forty-
four churches already duly registered under the 1990 law in three 
clusters, which were to continue in their church status by the force of the 
statute, without being required to undergo separate re-registration. In a 
number of other respects, like in offering a definition for religious 
activities,46 or listing activities which are not “primarily religious” in 
nature,47 the 2011 bill is clearly reminiscent of the bill which was 
introduced unsuccessfully in parliament by the previous government lead 
by FIDESZ’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán between 1998 and 2002.48 
In less than a month, at the end of an extraordinary session in 
parliament that ended far after midnight, parliament accepted an altered 
version of the bill, adopting amendments proposed by the parliamentary 
committee on constitutional affairs. Accordingly, churches which have 
operated in Hungary for at least twenty years (Article 14 (3)(c)) and at 
least 1,000 founding members (Article 15(1)(c)) would be registered not 
by a court of law, but by a super-majority of parliament (Article 11(1)) 
upon the initiative of the responsible minister (Articles 16 and 17). The 
Appendix to the law in its final form listed fourteen churches recognized 
ex lege, while the others—among them Christians, Buddhists and 
Muslims—were required to seek re-registration with a super-majority of 
parliament after the law took force. As a transitional measure, churches 
that faced losing their church status until their re-registration could 
expect to enter into a separate agreement with the government 
concerning the continued financing of their public interest tasks (Article 
30). Formerly registered churches that did not receive re-registration 
were meant to continue as associations. 
In the summer of 2011, churches that were left off the Appendix took 
 
 44. Bill No. T/3507, Article 14(3)(c) . 
 45. Bill No. T/3507, Article 37. 
 46. Bill No. T/3507, Article 6(1). 
 47. Bill No. T/3507, Article 6(2). 
 48. For a description of the previous bill in English, see Schanda, Religion and State in the 
Candidate Countries, supra note 34, at 343. For a critical commentary on the bill from an 
international human rights perspective, see Péter Buda, Állam és egyház: A polgári átalakulás 
eredményeinek leépítése [State and church: Demolishing the achievements of civic reforms], 5(2) 
FUNDAMENTUM 127, 131 et seq. (2001). 
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various steps. These requests took a variety of forms and reflected a 
range of different concerns. Some, like the Hungarian Evangelical 
Brotherhood, petitioned both parliament and the Minister of Justice, 
urging the amendment of the new law.49 Many others petitioned 
parliament for their recognition before the new law took force. These 
petitions were driven by concerns that under the new law it was unclear 
how essential criteria of church status (such as membership or length of 
operation) would be ascertained, while potential loss of acquired rights 
was also a widespread fear. Some issues raised were more specific. The 
Society of Krishna Consciousness was most concerned for title over their 
lands which have spiritual significance to the community as a whole. At 
the time  title in land was reserved exclusively for natural persons, the 
state, and churches under Hungarian law, while legal persons (such as 
commercial corporations, foundations, or associations) could not acquire 
title in arable land.50 The new Hungarian law on churches attracted such 
international attention that on September 6, 2011, Bence Rétvári (a 
secretary for parliament in the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Administration) attended a videoconference on the Hungarian law 
convened by Johns Hopkins University.51 It finally became apparent that 
parliament was not planning to amend the new church law significantly 
when it took steps to amend the land law to open up ownership rules for 
arable land before associations.52 
Then, in mid-December 2011, it was rumored in the press that the 
Constitutional Court was prepared to invalidate the new church law due 
to irregularities in the legislative process. On December 19, 2011, when 
the Constitutional Court’s decision was read out (but not yet published in 
the Official Journal),53 parliament withdrew the first cardinal law in a 
rider appended to the Act on National Minorities.54 Soon afterwards, the 
second cardinal law on church-state relations was introduced in 
 
 49. To read the exchange between the pastor of the chuch, the minister of justice, and the 
chairman of the parliamentary committee for human rights, see Levélváltás az egyházi törvényről 
[Correspondance on the church law], 15(3) FUNDAMENTUM 97–100. 
 50. Act no. 55 of 1994 on arable land, Articles 4–8. 
 51. Available with the website of the Hungarian Embassy in Washington at 
http://washington.kormany.hu/videoconference-on-hungary-s-new-law-on-churches. 
 52. The motion was first tabled by the human rights committee of parliament, chaired by 
Tamás Lukács, as rider No. 31 to Bill No. T/5001, as available in Hungarian at 
http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/05001/05001-0031.pdf. The amendment finally became part of the 
transitional provisions of the latest cardinal law on churches as Article 42. 
 53. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) (Constitutional Court): 164/2011 (XII. 20) AB decision.  
 54. Act No. 179 of 2011, Article 241. 
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parliament. The bill was first read on December 23, 2011, and was 
passed on December 30, 2011.55 The latest cardinal law on freedom of 
religion and churches entered into force at the same time as the new 
Constitution and its transitional provisions, on January 1, 2012. 
The latest cardinal law of December 2011 essentially reinstates the 
same registration procedure and criteria that were introduced in the 
summer of 2011. Parliament remains in charge of registering churches in 
an adjusted procedure for the popular initiative (népi kezdeményezés) 
(Article 14(3)), the details of which remain unclear.56 As a new element, 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is required to assist parliament with 
an expert opinion on certain religious qualities of the applicants (Article 
14(4)). Church status may be granted by parliament upon the request of 
1,000 petitioners (Article 14(3)) and after twenty years of presence in 
Hungary or 100 years of operations internationally (Article 14(2)(c)). 
With the exception of the fourteen recognized churches listed in the 
cardinal law’s Appendix, all previously-registered churches are 
transformed into a so-called religious association (Article 43(1)) and 
have to seek re-registration under the new law if they intend to preserve 
their church status. 
In February 2012, parliament assessed the status of over eighty 
previously recognized churches. These applications (or, at times, 
inquiries about church status) were submitted under the first version of 
the cardinal law, which never entered into force; therefore, the formal 
criteria of a potentially successful submission were far from clear. When 
handling the applications of previously duly registered churches for 
recognition under the latest cardinal law, parliament seems to have 
followed (more or less) the ordinary procedure for statutory amendments, 
and not the church recognition procedure prescribed in the cardinal law. 
It added flavor to the discussion in parliament that although the new law 
requires the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to certify the religious 
qualities of the applicants, after establishing a panel of experts,57 the 
chairman of the Academy refused to assist parliament with the 
recognition of individual churches. In an opinion which was kept 
confidential for many days, the Academy submitted that it did not wish 
 
 55. Act No. 206 of 2011 on freedom of conscience and religion, and the legal status of 
churches, religious congregations, and religious communities. 
 56. Popular initiative is a form of direct democracy in Hungary. Through popular initiative 
50,000 voters may request parliament to discuss a particular issue. 
 57. Press Release, Academy of Science (in Hungarian) (Jan. 10, 2012), available at 
http://mta.hu/data/cikk/12/91/3/cikk.../sajtokozlemeny_egyhaz_mta.pdf. 
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to assist parliament as the matter was clearly not for academic judgment 
or assessment, quite to the dismay of the sponsor of the amendment, who 
was essentially in charge of the registration process.58 
 
On February 27, 2012, parliament adopted an amendment to the 
cardinal law on churches, adding another eighteen communities to the 
list of “recognized churches.”59 On the same day, parliament, in a 
resolution, refused to recognize the church status of some sixty-six 
previously registered churches without providing any reasons for the 
refusal.60 Some of the eighteen new registered churches clearly do not 
meet the statutory criteria for church status as they undisputedly did not 
appear to have 1000 believers in Hungary. When recognizing the 
Anglican Church, the chairman of the Human Rights Committee of 
parliament openly admitted that the motivation for the decision was that 
four ambassadors belong to the Church.61 When recognizing the Coptic 
Church, the same chairman reasoned that in order to prevent the 
persecution of Christians in the world, it was important to recognize the 
oldest Christian churches and also the churches of world religions, in the 
hope of reciprocity in international relations.62 Still, the Taoist and the 
Hindu Vaishnava community did not receive recognition, although their 
inclusion would follow from this logic. At the same time, some churches 
that were turned down clearly satisfy statutory conditions. The 
Hungarian Evangelical Brotherhood, although it undisputedly met the 
statutory conditions, was turned down at this time, with the committee 
finding that they can apply next time, in the round when parliament is not 
making discretionary decisions, but following the recognition procedure 
(complete with popular initiative) as prescribed by the law. 
In the round of amendments in February 2012, it was argued in 
parliament that when amending the cardinal law to the effect of 
recognizing further churches, parliament took discretionary decisions 
 
 58. Tamás Lukács, Speech No. 361 (General Debate, Day No. 162) (Feb. 13, 2012) (in 
Hungarian),  available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=162&p_felsz=361&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=361. 
 59. Act No. 7 of 2012, amending the act on freedom of conscience and religion, and the legal 
status of churches, religious congregations and religious communities. 
 60. OGY Resolution on the Refusal of Church Registration, 8/2012 (II. 29). 
 61. Tamás Lukács, Committee of Human Rights, Records of Committee Meeting in the 
Journal of Parliament in Hungarian, p. 11 (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www.parlament.hu/biz39/bizjkv39/EMB/1202131.pdf. 
 62. Id. at 7.  
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alongside political criteria, and it purposefully did not follow the process 
for church recognition in the new cardinal law.63 Furthermore, it was 
confirmed in the parliamentary debate that the conditions for church 
recognition in the new cardinal law do not grant church status as a matter 
of a right, so parliament retains its discretion in granting church status 
even if an applicant clearly meets statutory criteria.64 
B. The Debate in Parliament: Uncovering Legislative Intent 
Although initially the debate in parliament was scattered with vague 
justifications on the aims the church law is meant to serve, the 
parliamentary record on the first cardinal law of the summer of 2011, the 
improved cardinal law of December 2011, and its subsequent amendment 
in February 2012 reveals that the Hungarian parliament regards the 
recognition of churches not as a question concerning freedom of religion 
but as a matter reserved for the discretion of the sovereign. It is in this 
logic that with the first cardinal law the task of church registration was 
removed from the competence of courts and became transferred to a 
qualified majority of parliament. It was the result of a conscious and 
calculated decision to enable parliament to decide on “who is a church 
and who is not.” This conception was further confirmed in the 
parliamentary debates in February 2011 when diplomatic relations and 
concern for the persecution of Christians in the world became a measure 
for church recognition. 
In the summer of 2011, in his opening statement introducing the bill, 
the sponsor of the bill Tamás Lukács (KDNP / Christian Democratic 
People’s Party) took it for granted that it is not necessary to prove an 
abuse of rights on a sensitive field, when Hungary has 343, or according 
to others, 362 religious organizations registered. It is not the topic of a 
parliamentary exposé to list the numerous types of abuses, but compared 
to the church numbers of other European countries it is not an 
exaggeration to say that abuse of rights in our country obtained 
increasingly large domains in the last 20 years.65 
 
 63. See Gergely Gulyás, Meeting of the Committee of Human Rights, Records of Committee 
Meeting in the Journal of Parliament in Hungarian, p. 13 (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.parlament.hu/biz39/bizjkv39/EMB/1202141.pdf.  
 64. See, e.g., supra note 55 (Tamás Lukács introducing the amendment). To the same effect, 
see Tamás Lukács, supra note 58, at 5. 
 65. Speech No. 2 (General Debate, Day No. 103), Journal of Parliament (June 23, 2011) (in 
Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=103&p_felsz=2&p_s
zoveg=&p_felszig=2. 
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It is certainly not impossible that several entities which were 
registered under the old law did abuse the advantageous economic 
(predominantly tax) status which church registration entailed. Under the 
1990 law it was clearly possible to dissolve churches that operated in 
violation of the law, as this opportunity could have been sufficient to 
remove the so-called business sects.66 It certainly would not have been 
impossible in the last twenty years to review the tax records of those 
religious groups with respect to which there were credible indicia of 
abuse (using the avenues of monitoring available under the 1990 law). 
This avenue would have been all the more advisable to take, as church 
status may have become so appealing as a legal form of operation for 
certain non-religious actors because of the wide range of economic 
advantages attached to it by the state. It is important to emphasize, 
therefore, that granting legal entity status to religious communities does 
not automatically entail that the state should also award tax exemptions 
to such organizations, or provide them with public funds. It was the 
peculiarity of the Hungarian law that certain economic benefits were 
automatically granted to churches. With a permissive church registration 
regime under the 1990 law, church status became easy to obtain, and 
ultimately easy to abuse. Nonetheless, despite occasional waves of 
outbursts against business sects and new religious movements, we have 
little information regarding the true extent of this problem. 
The government’s complaints about the unacceptably high number 
of registered churches prompted the lead speaker of the Socialist party on 
the opposition side, István Nyakó (MSZP / Hungarian Socialist Party) to 
note in the general debate of the first bill: “[According to the sponsors of 
the bill] the boundless and untransparent flourishing of various 
communities, denominations, churches devalued the existence and 
operation of churches which meet a real social demand.”67 Thus, it 
seems that in addition to an objection against the sheer number of 
churches, the parliamentary majority also had value preferences 
concerning which churches are acceptable in the Hungary of the new 
Constitution. In the summer the desire to serve justice over centuries was 
a prevalent theme offered to justify the new law. Chairman Lukács noted 
several times that the purpose of the new law was to ensure that a new 
 
 66. Act No. 4 of 1990, Article 20(2). 
 67. Speech No. 367 (Closing Debate, Day No. 108), Journal of Parliament (July 11, 2011) (in 
Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=108&p_felsz=367&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=367. 
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legal order is introduced reflecting the historical role of and injustices 
suffered by certain churches. Apparently, pluralism, or at least religious 
diversity, is not a welcome phenomenon. 
Despite the above statements, for a long time it seemed that the 
debate in parliament would not reveal the real purpose behind the new 
church law, and the only articulated justification would be the need to 
suppress business sects and to respect historic churches. The events of 
the summer finally took an exciting turn when the committee on 
constitutional affairs, upon the proposal of the faction leader of the 
governing party, János Lázár (FIDESz / Alliance of Young Democrats), 
introduced a last minute amendment to make the registration of churches 
the task of a qualified majority in parliament.68  He justified this 
amendment—which was ultimately adopted—by submitting that, similar 
to the recognition of national minorities, the recognition of churches was 
an act of sovereignty. Faction leader Lázár continued by saying: 
 
You should not delude yourselves with trying to transfer the 
responsibility for the decision to judges, because you are the ones who 
make the law on the basis of which the judges will decide who is a 
church and who is not [sic]. In 1990 the law on the basis of which it 
was determined who is a church and who is not was also made by 
deputies in parliament. This time we will make this law, and the 
responsibility is on us, whether we are ready to name in concrete terms 
who do we find as worthy and befitting for church status in 2011, or 
whether we are not . . . . Why could we not offer to churches, 
depending on whether the government concludes an agreement with 
them or not, to decide whether they want to maintain their church 
status, or not, as this will not prevent them from exercising their 
freedom of religion. This law opens the way for them to exercise their 
religious freedom. This much you have to admit. I believe that it is 
much more transparent, more open; and – starting from the 
responsibility we have towards national minorities – I believe that 
following from their oath all members of parliament are willing to 
undertake the responsibility for churches, to take decisions in the case 
of people who wish to exercise their religious freedom.69 
 
 68. The text of the amendment is available in Hungarian at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_irom.irom_madat?p_ckl=39&p_izon=3507&p_alsz=98. 
 69. Speech No. 403 (Closing Debate, Day No. 108), Journal of Parliament (July 11, 2011) (in 
Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=108&p_felsz=403&p
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In the parliamentary debate, the recognition of churches was likened 
to the recognition of national minorities. Note, however, that the 
recognition of national minorities does affect the exercise of state 
sovereignty to the extent that under the new Constitution national 
minorities (“a velünk élő nemzetiségek”) qualify as constitutive parts of 
the state:70 The political representation of national minorities has 
remained a component of Hungarian representative democracy under the 
new Constitution.71 In contrast, churches have never been envisioned as 
constitutive parts of the state under either modern Hungarian 
Constitution. 
In this logic, freedom of religion is granted to communities of 
believers on the basis of their commendable qualities and contributions, 
depending on the government’s assessment. The basis of this exercise is 
detached from freedom of religion as an individual right, and is 
dependent on the decision of the government and ultimately on the 
decision of parliament to grant church status. In this logic, therefore, it is 
the government or parliament (thus, ultimately, of the sovereign) that 
distributes a privilege to practice freedom of religion, pending further 
qualifications. 
The parliamentary debate in December 2011 was heavily 
underscored by the need to tailor church registration in a manner which 
reflects Hungarian identity, understood as a means of responding to “real 
social needs.” After all, the transitional provision appended to the new 
Constitution identifies social support for churches as a basis for 
permissible governmental discrimination between them (Article 21(1)). 
In this spirit, in December 2011, Secretary Szászfalvi justified the latest 
bill with a new argument by pointing out that the list of fourteen 
recognized churches indeed corresponds to the religious affiliations of 
ninety-nine percent of the population according to the 2001 census, 
adding that in 2010, ninety-one percent of the redirected transfers of one 
percent tax donations to churches went to those 14 churches which were 
 
_szoveg=&p_felszig=403. 
 70. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, National Avowal: “The nationalities living with 
us form part of the Hungarian political community and are constituent parts of the State.” In this 
respect, the new Constitution does not depart from the 1989 Constitution, and it is only the rhetoric 
which became more emotional, exchanging the terminology of “national and ethnic minorities” 
(1989 Constitution, Article 68(1)) for “nationalities living with us.” (2011 Constitution). The 1989 
Constitution also provided for representation of national and ethnic minorities (Article 68(4)). 
 71. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, art. XXIX.  
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on the list of recognized churches.72 This almost mechanical argument 
about responding to the religious makeup of the population (measure at a 
census and with tax transfers) was flavored by the need to recognize 
those churches only which the population identifies as real churches73 
and, invariably, emphasized that the task of parliament was to register 
only those churches which correspond to the value system of the new 
Constitution.74 These strains of argument revolving around the religious 
identity of Hungarians were finally connected to Secretary Szászfalvi in 
December 2011 when he said that, under the new law, the decision about 
registration does not even really rest with parliament and that, with the 
new criteria, the decision on church status “was taken by the people 
during previous centuries.”75 
Along with the above justifications, this round of amendments, 
which ultimately added eighteen more recognized churches to the list, 
also emphasized the discretionary nature of parliament’s decisions to 
grant church status to religious communities, the preference to recognize 
the representatives of world religions, and the need to defend Christianity 
in the world (instead of complying with statutory conditions for church 
 
 72. Secretary Szászfalvi, Speech No. 80 (General Debate, Day No. 158), Journal of 
Parliament (Dec. 23, 2011) (in Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=158&p_felsz=80&p_
szoveg=&p_felszig=80; see also, e.g., József Varga (Fidesz), Speech No. 176 (General Debate, Day 
No. 158), Journal of Parliament (Dec. 23, 2011) (in Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=158&p_felsz=176&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=176. For a reiteration of the same argument in February 2012, see Secretary 
Szászfalvi, Speech No. 363 (General Debate, day. No. 162), Journal of Parliament (Feb. 13, 2012) 
(in Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=162&p_felsz=363&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=363. 
 73. Béla Turi-Kovács (Fidesz), Speech No. 146 (General Debate, Day No. 158), Journal of 
Parliament (Dec. 23, 2011) (in Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=158&p_felsz=146&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=146; see also Béla Turi-Kovács (Fidesz), Speech No. 172 (General Debate, 
Day No. 158), Journal of Parliament ( Dec. 23, 2011) (in Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=158&p_felsz=172&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=172. 
 74. János Kővári (Fidesz), Speech No. 244 (Second Reading, Day No. 160), Journal of 
Parliament (Dec. 28, 2011) (in Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=160&p_felsz=244&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=244. 
 75. Sec’y Szászfalvi, Speech No. 250 (Second Reading, Day No. 160), Journal of Parliament 
(Dec. 28, 2011) (in Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=160&p_felsz=250&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=250 
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status).76 These considerations clearly fit the logic of the exercise of 
sovereign powers, which emerged in the debate on the first bill in the 
summer of 2011. 
Note, however, that in the Hungarian Constitutional tradition if the 
language of sovereignty is invoked in relation to religious manifestations 
in general, or to churches in particular, it is best understood as a 
reference to the powers of the monarch to closely manage and govern 
churches under the doctrine of the Holy Crown (see Part II.B). The 
exercise of this power visibly violates the autonomy of religious 
communities and is antithetical to the separation of church and state, a 
requirement of the new Constitution. A sovereignty-based regulatory 
model which distributes the opportunity to exercise religious freedom 
according to the discretionary decision of the sovereign is by definition 
unfit for a constitutional democracy entrusted with protecting freedom of 
religion as a human right.77 Therefore, the concept of sovereignty as 
reheated in the parliamentary debate of the new church law is an 
extremely dangerous and inadequate instrument. 
From this unorthodox perspective, the basis of parliamentary 
authority to recognize churches with a super-majority becomes clear. The 
question remaining for analysis is whether this justification for the 
exercise of discretionary parliamentary power can be squared in in terms 
of its justifications and consequences with European human rights 
standards. The following section will raise concerns not only about the 
justifications advanced by the Hungarian government in support of the 
new law (prominently: the need to keep the number of recognized 
churches low) but also about deprivation from  
 
previously uncontested legal entity status and the adequacy of entry level 
status offered for religious associations in the new regime. 
 
 76. See Tamás Lukács, Speech No. 361 (General Debate, Day No. 162), Journal of 
Parliament (Feb.13, 2012) (in Hungarian), available at  
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=162&p_felsz=361&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=361; see also Tamás Lukács, Speech No. 134 (Second Reading, Day No. 163), 
Journal of Parliament (Feb. 14, 2012) (in Hungarian), available at 
http://www.mkogy.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=163&p_felsz=128&p
_szoveg=&p_felszig=134. 
 77. For the significance of the tension arising out of this distinction, see EVANS, supra note 
18, at 44. 
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III. THE 2011 HUNGARIAN LAW IN LIGHT OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
STANDARDS 
In order to fully appreciate recent developments in Hungary under 
the new Constitution, the last part of this article will briefly analyze the 
new law in light of European human rights standards. The new 
Hungarian law applies to all previously registered churches, with the 
exception of the ones listed in the extended Appendix of the new law. All 
other churches that wish to continue their operation as a church, and not 
as an association, will have to seek re-registration. As even a brief and 
superficial analysis finds, the new Hungarian law appears to violate a 
number of established rules of European human rights jurisprudence. 
A General Considerations on Access to Legal Entity Status as an Aspect 
of Freedom of Religion as a Human Right 
As a preliminary issue, it is important to briefly reflect on the 
relationship of freedom of religion and church registration, especially 
since in the Hungarian parliamentary debate it was suggested that, 
through regulation, the state may define the circle of acceptable 
practitioners of religious freedom. It is well known that freedom of 
religion as a human right is protected in Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration, Article 18 of the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights, Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and, most recently, in Article 10 of the European Union Charter. It is also 
widely accepted that freedom of religion has individual as well as 
collective aspects, and that the desire to operate in an organized manner 
and to seek legal entity status in order to assist this organized operation is 
a protected manifestation of the right.78 Churches are not worthy of 
protection because of their mere existence, but because they serve as the 
means and the framework of the meaningful enjoyment of one of the 
oldest fundamental human rights. In the words of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR): “the autonomous existence of religious 
communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is 
thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 
affords.”79 Despite suggestions to the contrary to this effect in the 
Hungarian parliamentary debate, freedom of religion is a human right 
recognized in international and human rights laws, the exercise of which 
 
 78. The evolution of Article 9 in this respect is explained in detail in PIETER VAN DIJK ET AL., 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 764–65 (4th ed. 2006). 
 79. Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 44 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 912 (2007). 
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does not (and cannot) depend on the good will or benevolence of the 
government or parliament. 
The ECtHR has been consistent in reaffirming that, although the 
member states may regulate the exercise of freedom of religion, this may 
only be done in a neutral and impartial fashion,80 in a manner that 
promotes religious diversity and pluralism. These are features that the 
ECtHR regards to be key characteristics of European democracies.81 The 
state is not expected, and is clearly not required, to act as an umpire 
between competing religious communities, and it cannot become 
involved in settling either inter- or intra-faith disputes.82 
As emphasized by the ECtHR, the legal registration of a religious 
community as a church cannot become the precondition or prerequisite 
of the free exercise of religion as an individual right.83 As the following 
analysis will also demonstrate, it is also accepted that access to legal 
entity status may be subject to certain narrowly defined conditions so 
long as these do not interfere with a religious group’s ability to carry out 
“the full range of religious activities and activities normally exercised by 
registered non-governmental entities.”84 For instance, it is appropriate 
for the state to keep record of various entities to which it grants legal 
personality.85 Furthermore, due to the specificities of the Hungarian 
context, it might be important to add that criteria for obtaining legal 
entity status may be separate from conditions for state funding, as is the 
case in many leading jurisdictions. 
 
 80. For an analysis of the early jurisprudence on “neutral and generally applicable laws,” see 
CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
168 et seq. (2001). 
 81. Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 1339 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 1362 (2002); Metropolitan Church 
of Bessarabia, 35 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 13 (2002); see also Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others 
v. Turkey (GC), 37 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 33 (2003). For a critical discussion of the ECtHR’s conception 
of diversity and pluralism, see Judge Francois Tulkens, The European Convention on Human Rights 
and Church-State Relations: Pluralism v Pluralisms, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2275 (2009). 
 82. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, 306 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 336 (2002); Hasan and Chaush, 
1339 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 1358-1359 (2002); Serif v. Greece, 561 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 572-573 (2001); see 
also VAN DIJK, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 75, at 770 (discussing such restrictions in the 
context of the legitimate aim requirement). 
 83.  Masaev v Moldova, (unreported) Application no. 6303/05; Judgment of 12 May 2009, § 
26; ROBIN WHITE & CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 421 (2006); 
see also OSCE / ODIHR, GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO RELIGION OR 
BELIEF 17 (2003), available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/13993.  
 84. Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, App. No. 77703/01 (14 September 2007), § 
123.; Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 18147/02, 5 April 2007, §84; The 
Moscow Branch of The Salvation Army, App. No. 72881/01, 5 Oct. 2006, §74. 
 85. OSCE / ODIHR GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at 17. 
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The relationship of churches and states is described by many models 
in the literature, admitting that the wide array of national variations is 
due to the historical circumstances of each country.86 Therefore, a 
careless international comparison may easily yield to misleading 
conclusions, since several national legal systems might not have 
straightforward comparators. The Guidelines of the OSCE / ODHIR on 
legislation pertaining to freedom of religion emphasize that the primary 
reason to provide legal entity status to religious communities is to 
facilitate their religious life and not to install state control over them. As 
a result, the Guidelines in line with ECtHR jurisprudence urge the 
member states to make such solutions available for religious 
communities which permit “at a minimum, access to the basic rights 
associated with legal personality—for example, opening a bank account, 
renting or acquiring property for a place of worship or for other religious 
uses, entering into contracts, and the right to sue and be sued—should be 
available without excessive difficulty.”87 Importantly, as Carolyn Evans 
points out, despite profound differences between member states, unlike 
in other contexts under Article 9, “the margin of appreciation was not 
used by the Court in any of the registration cases to dilute the religious 
freedom rights of groups applying for registration.”88 
B. Specific Concerns About the New Hungarian Law in Light of ECtHR 
Jurisprudence 
During the past decade, the ECtHR has developed well-discernible 
principles and thresholds in its jurisprudence concerning church 
registration.89 The ECtHR regards legal personality (i.e., legal entity 
status) acquired as a result of governmental registration as a prominent 
aspect of freedom of religion protected by Article 9 of the Convention.90 
Denial of access to legal entity status to a group of believers amounts to a 
violation of freedom of religion (Article 9) and freedom of association 
 
 86. The European Convention does not prescribe a particular church-state regime. See, e.g., 
Carolyn Evans & Christopher A. Thomas, Church-State Relations in the European Court of Human 
Rights, 2006 BYU. L. REV. 699, 699 (2006). 
 87. OSCE / ODIHR GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at 17-18. 
 88. Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of 
Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture, 26 J. L. & RELIGION 321, 335 (2010–11). 
 89. Id. at 321, 327–29. 
 90. Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 424 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 
440 (2009); Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others, 306 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 336 (2002); see 
also Koretskyy and Others v. Ukraine, (unreported) Application no. 40269/02, 3 April 2008, § 40; 
Kimlya v Russia, (unreported), Application no. 72881/01, Judgment of 6 October, 2006, § 85. 
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(Article 11) of the Convention.91 The ECtHR pays special attention to 
multi-tiered systems wherein recognition at the lowest level does not 
provide access to legal personality. This is due to the fact that lack of 
access to legal personality deprives religious communities of those rights 
and opportunities, without which these religious communities clearly 
suffer disadvantage. In one case, the ECtHR found a violation because 
“the applicants were unable to obtain recognition and effective 
enjoyment of their rights to freedom of religion and association in any 
organisational form.”92 
In the last fifteen years, the ECtHR decided a number of cases on 
registration and re-registration of churches that shed light on European 
standards.93 Most of the cases originated in Russia after a 1997 law 
introduced a burdensome re-registration procedure for already 
recognized churches.94 The most important lesson from these ECtHR 
cases is that re-registration of churches does not per se violate the 
Convention. With regards to the re-registration procedures, however, the 
ECtHR emphasized that (since re-registration requirements affect 
churches which have already obtained legal entity status) with the new 
procedure the state shall provide very weighty reasons for denying 
registration if the affected church had not otherwise violated the law 
(apart from operating without the required new registration while waiting 
for their re-registration process to conclude).95 
These cases suggest that the delays of the re-registration process may 
themselves violate the Convention, because during the transitional period 
the state forces previously registered churches to operate in a less 
advantageous (and less beneficial) legal framework. This conclusion is in 
line with other components of ECtHR jurisprudence, as the ECtHR also 
considers it to be a violation if delays imposed by a member state force a 
 
 91. ROBIN C. A. WHITE ET AL., THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 419 (5th 
ed. 2010); see also VAN DIJK, supra note 75, at 765 (quoting Hasan and Chaush, 1339 Eur. Ct. H. R. 
1358–59 (2002). 
 92. Kimlya v Russia, (unreported), Application no. 72881/01, Judgment of 6 Oct., 2006, § 
87. 
 93. PAUL M. TAYLOR, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, UN AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
AND PRACTICE 246 (2005) (noting that the ECtHR came rather late into assessing the impact of 
restrictive registration laws, thus following in the footsteps of the UN Special Rapporteur). 
 94. Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, 46 E.H.R.R. at 16 (2008); Moscow Branch of 
the Salvation Army v. Russia, 44 E.H.H.R at 46 (2007); Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others 
v. Russia, (unreported) Application no. 302/02, Judgment of 10 June 2010. 
 95. Church of Scientology Moscow, 46 E.H.R.R. at 16; Moscow Branch of the Salvation 
Army, 44 E.H.R.R. at 46. 
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religious community to operate without registration.96 Under the new 
Hungarian law, previously registered churches that are not listed in the 
Appendix of the law will be able to function as religious associations 
until their new recognition is processed (Article 34(1)). The Venice 
Commission found it problematic that the new law foresees a one-year 
long window for re-recognition of previously registered churches 
(Article 14(5)), a waiting period which is excessive by international 
standards.97 Furthermore, as the procedure of recognition leaves 
parliament broad discretion (i.e. parliament may recognize as churches 
the religious groups which meet the statutory conditions) and as the 
contours of religious association status (especially the scope of 
autonomy) are unclear, it is beyond doubt that newly-minted religious 
associations will be deprived of key benefits of church status for an 
indefinite period. 
Arguably, under the latest Hungarian church registration regime, 
entry-level legal entity status is provided to religious communities in the 
form of the newly-created, so-called religious associations operating 
under the Civil Code and the new cardinal law on associations (Article 
6(1)).98 Such religious associations differ in one respect only from other 
associations: resolutions of religious associations passed in connection 
with their religious operation are exempt from judicial review.99 Since 
associations are required to operate with a registered membership under 
Hungarian law,100 this format is unfit for the exercise of religious 
freedom as the registration requirement runs counter to negative 
confessional freedom. In addition, under Hungarian law, associations are 
expected to operate in a democratic, self-governing fashion. Insisting on 
this type of structure is perfectly reasonable for typical secular 
associations, but it can be highly problematic for religious communities 
that believe as a matter of religious principle in a different form of 
organization (e.g., a church with a hierarchical ecclesiastical polity or 
with representational structures that do not conform to standard 
association law).  Indeed, it is important to remember that the 
 
 96. Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 424 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 
440 (2009). 
 97. Venice Commission on Hungary, paras 43-45. 
 98. Act No. CLXXV of 2011 on the freedom of association, on public purpose status, and the 
operation of civic organizations replaces Act No. 2 of 1989 on the freedom of association. 
 99. See Article 62(7) of the Civil Code, and Article 62(7) of Act No. CLXXV of 2011 on the 
freedom of association.  
 100. Article 61(1) of the Civil Code, also Article 5 of Act No. CLXXV of 2011 on the 
freedom of association. 
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organizational structure of religious communities is often a matter of 
deep religious conviction. 
The ECtHR also examines the length of the mandatory waiting 
period, and the government has to justify the length of the waiting period 
prescribed in national law. Not long after finding that a fifteen-year 
waiting period (required for re-registration) violated the Convention in 
the Russian context,101 the ECtHR also found that, in the Austrian 
context, a ten-year waiting period (required for upper tier registration) 
violated the Convention. In the Austrian case, the ECtHR took into 
account that the affected religious community had already operated in the 
country for over half a century on a lower level of registration, and it also 
considered that the government decided to enter into a concordat with 
another religious community that had operated in Austria for a shorter 
period than the applicant had.102 Consequently, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the twenty-year waiting period imposed in the Hungarian 
law does not meet the level of protection expected by the ECtHR. 
Although the ECtHR has examined the length of the statutory 
waiting period a number of times, it somewhat surprisingly has not 
assessed the threshold membership requirements set for access to legal 
entity status. Since the ECtHR has been consistent—if not persistent—in 
reminding the member states that under Article 9 it was their task to 
preserve religious diversity and pluralism, the Hungarian justification 
according to which parliament wished to curb the number of registered 
churches is unlikely to be accepted under Article 9(2). Since the 
Hungarian parliament decided to significantly raise the number of 
supporters required for recognition (more precisely, by ten times), it is 
expected that if the law is challenged in Strasbourg, the ECtHR will wish 
to hear the reasons behind raising the minimum membership requirement 
in particular. 
Currently, only Slovakia requires more founding members for a 
registered church with its infamous 20,000 threshold. After the 
Hungarian law, the second-highest requirement is in Croatia (500),103 
followed by the Czech (300),104 and Austria (300 at entry level)105 
 
 101. Kimlya v Russia, (unreported), Application no. 72881/01, Judgment of 6 Oct., 2006. 
 102. Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 424 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 
17 (2009). 
 103. For an English translation of the law (Article 21(1)), see LAWS ON RELIGION AND THE 
STATE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 93 et seq. (W. Cole Durham, Jr. & S. Ferrari eds., 2003). 
 104. For an English translation of the law (Article 10(2)(3)) see id. at 105. 
 105. For a recent English language description of the Austrian law, see Stefan Schima, Focus: 
Freedom of Religion in Austria, 3 VIENNA J. INT’L CON. L. 199, 202 (2009), available at www.icl-
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Therefore, despite the optimism in the parliamentary debate, the new 
Hungarian requirement became the second highest in Europe. With such 
a high requirement, the Hungarian government certainly did not live up 
to the OSCE / ODHIR guidelines which suggest abandoning high 
minimum membership requirements.106 The opinion of the Venice 
Commission insisted that the new Hungarian law does not require 1,000 
founding members, but instead, it prescribes 1,000 sympathizers who 
petition on behalf of the religious group. While the Venice Commission 
did not find the threshold too high by definition, the opinion noted that 
“it is clear that this condition constitutes an obstacle for small religious 
groups benefiting from the protection afforded by the Act.”107 
 
International comparison matters not only for national pride and self-
respect but also because the ECtHR is known to regularly take into 
account European trends and consensus (where it exists) when it 
determines the level and intensity of rights protection.108 Recently, in a 
party registration case, the ECtHR compared national rules on minimum 
membership requirements and found that although thirteen countries 
prescribed a threshold, the Russian requirement of 50,000 founding 
members for party registration is considerably higher than any other rule 
in Europe.109 This Russian requirement is similar to the one of the new 
Hungarian law to the extent that the Russian law raised the existing 
threshold requirement by five times and required the re-registration of 
already registered and functioning political parties. The ECtHR 
consulted the parliamentary record as well as arguments submitted 
before the Russian Constitutional Court in prior proceedings to find that, 
with this adjustment, the Russian government intended “to strengthen 
political parties and limit their number in order to avoid disproportionate 
expenditure from the budget during electoral campaigns and prevent 
excessive parliamentary fragmentation and, in so doing, promote stability 
of the political system.”110 Upon a thorough analysis, the ECtHR 
rejected these justifications in light of its findings.111 
 
journal.com.  
 106. OSCE / ODIHR GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at 17. 
 107. Venice Commission on Hungary,  ¶ 53. 
 108. For a recent, famous example of consensus analysis in the religion domain, see Lautsi v 
Italy (GC), Application no. 30814/06, Judgment of 18 March 2011. 
 109. Republican Party of Russia v Russia, (unreported) Application no. 12976/07, Judgment 
of 12 April 2011, § 110.  
 110. Id. § 111. 
 111. Id. §§ 112–14. 
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It remains to be seen how the ECtHR will react to some of the 
primary reasons offered by the Hungarian government in defense of a 
higher threshold, such as the need to reduce the number of registered 
churches to bring order to the religious scene or to make the church 
sector better reflect Hungarian traditions. Considering key similarities 
between the Russian and the Hungarian laws, it would be rather 
surprising to see the ECtHR depart from the stance it took about an 
unnecessarily high registration threshold preventing the meaningful 
exercise of a Convention right. 
Regarding religious communities awaiting re-registration, it is clear 
that the ECtHR leaves the member states considerable discretion in 
deciding which faiths to accept. At the same time, it is easy to detect a 
certain impatience in the jurisprudence when the members states appear 
to delay the registration or recognition of communities that have an 
established record of unproblematic presence in the country (especially 
when the case involves registration on a higher level in a multi-tier 
system) and also of churches which are known to freely operate in other 
member states.112 While the Hungarian parliament was particularly 
concerned with the illegal operations of business sects, it is important to 
emphasize that at the time of the passing of the latest law in December 
2011 and its subsequent amendment in February 2012, no records of 
successful prosecutions of registered churches for financial irregularities 
surfaced. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a potential refusal to 
re-register internationally well-known and respected congregations 
which functioned smoothly for twenty years will be met with disapproval 
in Strasbourg. 
As the above analysis already indicated, in addition to the conditions 
of church registration, the ECtHR also examines the nature of the 
proceedings. It is a well-established requirement in its jurisprudence that 
the protection of rights cannot be illusory, and that the procedures 
associated with the exercise of various rights cannot become an obstacle 
to the enjoyment of the right. In the context of church registration, it does 
not only mean that the requirements of the registration process have to be 
clear and predictable, but it also follows that the conditions for 
registration have to be such that they could be met realistically.113 The 
 
 112. Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v Russia, (unreported) Application no. 
302/02, Judgment of 10 June 2010, § 155; Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. 
Austria, 424 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 446 (2009) 
 113. Church of Scientology Moscow v Russia, 304 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 325–26 (2008) (e.g. 
requiring the submission of numerous originals of documents, in multiple proceedings).  
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ECtHR also expects the state to be consistent throughout the registration 
process as it amounts to a violation if the state makes self-contradictory 
representations at different stages of the same registration process.114 It 
is highly questionable whether a registration procedure that hinges upon 
parliament’s discretionary decision in individual cases meets these 
standards concerning the nature of the registration procedure itself. 
The Achilles heel of the new Hungarian law is certainly the 
provision that hands over the registration of churches to a qualified 
majority of parliament from courts of law. The new law does not indicate 
any opportunity for appeal or seek judicial review of a rejection at any 
stage of the process. The parliamentary resolution in which the request of 
sixty-six previously registered churches was rejected is not eligible for 
judicial or constitutional review in Hungary.115 Apart from being in clear 
violation of Article XXVIII(7) of the new Hungarian Constitution, this is 
clearly in contravention of ECtHR jurisprudence which requires under 
Article 6(1) access to a court outside the criminal process.116 More 
specifically, in the freedom of religion context, the ECtHR has found that 
lack of access to court in a dispute over church property violated the 
Convention.117 Considering that the ECtHR found that the absence of a 
judicial avenue violated Articles 9 and 6 of the Convention in case where 
the applicants sought to contest much less than a refusal to register a 
church, it is reasonable to expect that the ECtHR will find the Hungarian 
law to violate the Convention. 
As was mentioned already several times, it is a fundamental 
requirement of the ECtHR jurisprudence that member states strive to 
preserve religious diversity as an aspect of democracy in a neutral and 
impartial fashion. The requirement of neutrality, also expressed in the 
form of the principle of non-discrimination (Article 14),118 applies 
irrespective of the histories and national traditions of the member states. 
It is an important caveat for the Hungarian legislator that the decisions 
that the state takes regarding particular churches also fall within the 
general human rights framework established by the Convention and 
 
 114. Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia, 912 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 934 (2007). 
 115. Judicial review of executive and administrative action is regulated by Act No. 115 of 
2004 on the general rules of administrative action and services. 
 116. Golder v the United Kingdom, 524 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 534 (1979–80).  
 117. Sambata Bihor Greek Catholic Church v. Romania, (unreported) Application no. 
48107/99, Judgment of 12 January 2011. In this case, petitioners had to turn to a commission (but 
not an independent court) to settle their dispute. 
 118. Note that Hungary signed, but did not ratify, Protocol no. 12.  
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developed by the ECtHR. In practice, this means that concordats and 
similar bilateral agreements with churches are assessed within the legal 
framework applicable to the exercise of freedom of religion and to 
church-state relations as a whole. 
For instance, in addition to its multi-tier church registration system, 
Austria maintains a concordat regime with select churches. Thus, while 
the Austrian authorities were unwilling to register Jehovah’s Witnesses 
at a higher tier, the government concluded a concordat with the Coptic 
church. Since the latter has operated in Austria for a much shorter time 
than the Witnesses, the ECtHR took the concordat as evidence of 
discrimination in the application of the waiting period requirement 
imposed by Austrian law.119 The ECtHR followed a similar track in a 
Croatian case where the government refused to conclude concordats 
(required for access to hospitals and prisons) with certain Protestant 
communities. Since the applicant communities met the statutory 
requirements on the basis of which other churches were selected for their 
concordats, the ECtHR rejected the government’s justification claiming 
that the other churches performed a historic role and found Croatia in 
violation.120 In the light of these lessons from the discrimination context, 
it is highly unlikely that the distinctions drawn by the Hungarian 
parliament between previously registered churches under the new 
cardinal law will be accepted by the ECtHR. The historic role of certain 
churches already proved an unacceptable reason in defense of 
discrimination, and the need to protect the status quo or to improve 
diplomatic relations does not sound much more pertinent. Although the 
ECtHR so far has not ruled on the need to exercise state sovereignty in 
selecting religious communities for registration as churches, this reason 
does not appear to come within any of the legitimate aims accepted for 
the limiting Convention rights, either. 
In closing, note that this brief overview reflects only on those 
features of the new Hungarian law which raise concerns even before the 
law enters into force and is applied in practice. It is difficult to predict 
how the law will function when claims for registration start to reach 
parliament. Nonetheless, as even such a short overview reveals, the 
Hungarian law clearly falls short of the applicable European human 
rights standards. 
 
 119. Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 424 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 
444–45 (2009). 
 120. Savez Crkava “Rijec Zivota” and Others v. Croatia, (unreported) Application no. 
7798/08, Judgment of 9 December 2010. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This article introduced the new Hungarian legal framework entering 
into force on January 1, 2012 concerning freedom of religion and church-
state relations. The Article first reviewed the changes to the 
constitutional framework, placing developments in their broader 
historical and jurisprudential context. This was followed by a detailed 
analysis of the emergence of the new law, its coverage in the press, and 
the parliamentary debate itself. While the new law notably introduced a 
relatively long waiting period (twenty years domestically or 100 years 
internationally), a remarkably high threshold for registration (1,000 
members), and a requirement of re-registration for already registered 
churches, the feature which distinguishes the new Hungarian law is the 
requirement that gives parliament discretionary authority over church 
registration. As such, the new rules amount to a serious departure from 
the regime that was in place in Hungary under the 1989 Constitution and 
the 1990 law on churches. Since the new rules impose significant 
burdens on the exercise of religious liberty and affect profoundly and 
negatively the overwhelming majority of religious communities that have 
been registered as churches for two decades or more, it was necessary to 
explore carefully the reasons motivating such profound changes. In its 
last part, the Article assessed key components of the new Hungarian 
statute in light of the requirements of the European Convention on 
Human Rights as interpreted in ECtHR jurisprudence. 
The analysis reveals that the Hungarian parliament was committed to 
redefining the framework of freedom of religion and church-state 
relations in Hungary. While initially justified by the need to reduce the 
number of registered churches and to reinforce Hungarian traditions, the 
new law was ultimately explained in parliament as an exercise of state 
sovereignty, a decision taken by parliament on “who is a church and who 
is not.” The references to the unlimited powers of the sovereign, the 
vision of parliament as an ultimate arbiter of matters of identity and 
distributor of privileges of engagement in matters of civil and political 
rights, together with an utter distrust of the judiciary as voiced in the 
parliamentary debate, are equally problematic. These propositions 
suggest that the parliament of a constitution-making majority clearly 
does not view the new Constitution or European human rights 
commitments as a constraint on their own powers for present or future 
decisions. 
Although rather tempting, it would be a serious mistake to blame the 
new cardinal law completely on the language of the new Constitution, or 
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of the National Avowal. This Article argued that the new law cozily fits 
within the unstable pattern of centuries of religious toleration in 
Hungary. In this pattern, periods of toleration exchange places with 
periods of repression and intolerance, where the enemy of the day is 
chosen according to political demands and interests. The new 
Constitution’s National Avowal commits Hungarians to add their rich 
national culture to European diversity. In order to do so, Hungary’s new 
Constitution is not expected to be diverse and European, though it is 
sufficient for it to be unique.121 As this Article demonstrates, Hungary 
with its new Constitution and new cardinal law on freedom of religion 
and churches is on the track of straying far away from the European 
standard and building a unique, if unusual, regime of its own. The only 
hope for change stems from the fact that the Hungarian parliament 
decided to make its mark and stand out in a terrain where the ECtHR 
seems to leave the member states with a narrower-than-usual margin of 
appreciation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, National Avowal: “We are proud that our 
people has over the centuries defended Europe in a series of struggles and enriched Europe’s 
common values with its talent and diligence . . . . We commit to promoting and safeguarding our 
heritage, our unique language, Hungarian culture, the languages and cultures of nationalities living 
in Hungary, along with all man-made and natural assets of the Carpathian Basin.”  
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